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Abstract
This paper employs survey data on the reasons to quit of Dutch
job changers who entered or left a public sector job in 2001. We show
that workers reasons to quit their public sector job inuence their
decision to stay in or leave their industry of employment. A bad ex-
perience with, for instance, pay, work pressure, or job duties makes
a change in industry more likely. Likewise, many workers who quit
out of dissatisfaction with pay or management leave the public sector
altogether. Lastly, it is shown that workersreasons to quit fully ex-
plain the di¤erences in wage growth between intra- and interindustry
job movers.
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1 Introduction
In many countries, the public sector faces problems recruiting and retaining
skilled personnel (OECD, 2001). Borjas (2003) shows that since 1970, the
private sector in the US has become nancially more attractive to high-skilled
workers, as wage dispersion has increased more in the private sector than in
the public sector. In the UK, public sector workers felt that problems with
bureaucracy, workload, pay, and management were specic to the public
sector, and these factors were the main reasons for workers to leave the
public sector (Audit Commission, 2002). Still, many workers remained in
the public sector, as personal fullment made up for the lack of nancial
rewards(p. 29). This makes clear that nonpecuniary factors may inuence
workersdecision to stay in or leave the public sector.
It has been shown that nonpecuniary factors are important determinants
of quit behaviour. Akerlof et al. (1988) nd that more people quit their
job for nonpecuniary reasons than for pecuniary reasons, and argue that
any realistic portrait of labor turnover must include a role for nonpecuniary
rewards(p. 498). Nonetheless, many authors have ignored these factors in
analyses of job mobility, mainly due to lack of data.1
In this paper, we employ data from a survey conducted in 2002 by the
Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations among employees who
either accepted or left a public sector job in 2001. Employees who had left a
job had to indicate the importance of 19 di¤erent job aspects in their decision
to leave the job. In line with Akerlof et al. (1988), we nd that respondents
stressed the importance of job duties, atmosphere at work, and management,
but considered pay less important.
We show that workersreasons to quit a¤ect their decision to stay in their
industry of employment or to move to another industry. When pay, work
pressure, working conditions, job duties, or management are important in
the decision to quit, workers are more likely to move to another industry. In
contrast, dissatisfaction with the possibilities for education, the atmosphere
at work, the number of hours worked, or commuting time makes it less likely
that a worker moves to another industry. We argue that, as the rst group of
job aspects is more likely to be correlated among jobs within an industry than
the latter group, workers apparently use their experience in the initial job to
update their expectations on other jobs in the industry. When job aspects
are correlated among jobs within an industry, a bad experience reduces the
expected value of all jobs in the industry, making a change in industry more
1See, among many others, Topel and Ward (1992), Light and McGarry (1998), Camp-
bell (2001), McCaughlin and Bils (2001), and Lima (2004).
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likely
Relatedly, we nd that workers who consider pay or management impor-
tant in their decision to quit relatively often leave the public sector altogether.
In contrast, when the possibilities for education are important in the deci-
sion to quit, workers are more likely to stay in the public sector. These
ndings are an indication of the relative strengths and weaknesses of public
sector jobs. Lastly, it appears that interindustry job movers experience larger
wage growth than intra-industry job movers. However, this wage premium
disappears once the estimation controls for workersreasons to quit.
A large literature has evolved on the causes and consequences of job
mobility. Bartel (1982) studies the e¤ects of several job attributes on quit
behaviour, and nds that for young men, repetitive work and bad working
conditions increase the probability that a worker quits, whereas for older men
repetitive work may actually decrease this probability. Higher starting wages
decrease the likelihood of a separation (Topel and Ward, 1992), whereas
workers are more likely to quit jobs that are complex (Weiss, 1984), or that
pose health and safety risks (Viscusi, 1979). Altonji and Paxson (1992) show
that females whose family composition has changed obtain larger changes in
the number of hours worked when they move to another employer than by
staying in the same job. The authors argue that adjusting working hours to
changing preferences may be easier by changing jobs than within a job.
Workersown assessment of job attributes also provides information on
the likelihood of a quit. Freeman (1978) already found that job satisfac-
tion is negatively related to the probability that a worker quits, see also
Akerlof et al. (1988) and Clark et al. (1998). A decomposition of job sat-
isfaction into satisfaction with di¤erent job aspects reveals that satisfaction
with job security is the best predictor of quits among UK workers (Clark,
2001), whereas satisfaction with the type of work appears most important in
Denmark (Kristensen and Westergard-Nielsen, 2004).
Topel and Ward (1992) nd that one-third of total wage growth of young
men in their rst ten years in the labor market occurs through job changes.
Akerlof et al. (1988) show that workers who quit out of dissatisfaction with
pay usually obtain a wage increase, whereas a substantial fraction of workers
who quit for nonpecuniary reasons take a wage cut. Still, both groups report
being better o¤ after the job change. Keith and McWilliams (1997) nd
that the wage growth of employees who quit for family-related reasons is
smaller than the wage growth of both non-movers and workers who quit for
non-family-related reasons.
A common feature of these studies is that the data used contains both
movers and non-movers. As we only have information on workers who entered
or left a public sector job, we cannot compare movers to non-movers. The
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contribution of this paper lies in the extensive set of reasons to quit, which we
can relate to a workers decision to stay in or leave the industry of employment
and to the change in a workers wage.
In our data, employees who considered pay an important reason to quit
their job obtain signicantly larger wage increases, as in Akerlof et al. (1988).
The same holds for employees seeking more autonomy. By contrast, employ-
ees experience signicantly smaller wage growth if they left their former job
out of dissatisfaction with work pressure or with the combination of work
and private life. The magnitude of these e¤ects is substantial. Employees
complaining about nancial rewards obtain wage increases up to 10.8 per-
centage points higher than employees who regarded pay not important in
their decision to quit. Dissatisfaction with work pressure yields up to 4.8
percentage points lower wage growth. The latter result is close to ndings by
Villanueva (2004). He estimates that German job movers who indicate that
their work load has worsened obtain 5 percent higher wage growth, whereas
an improvement of work load yields 3 percent smaller wage growth, both
relative to workers whose work load did not change.
A common nding in the literature is that job movers who voluntarily
left their job receive larger wage increases than workers who are laid of or
discharged (McCaughlin, 1991, Keith and McWilliams, 1997). We nd sim-
ilar e¤ects for a somewhat weaker distinction: Employees who consider the
threat of an employer-initiated separation important in their decision to quit
receive signicantly smaller wage increases.2 However, we can not rule out
that this result is due to a small number of actual layo¤s and discharges in
the sample.
Rather than the e¤ects of workersreasons to quit, Mathios (1989) studies
the e¤ect of US workersreasons for entering their current job on their wages.
In accordance with our ndings, employees claim to attach less value to pay
than to interesting, challenging, and enjoyable work in their decision to enter
their job. Moreover, Mathios (1989) nds that employees who entered their
job for nancial rewards earn signicantly higher wages than other workers.
Highly educated workers with preferences for convenient hours or aiding other
people receive lower wages, while preferences for status and enjoyable work
are positively related to the level of pay.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section
describes the data. Section 3 reports the e¤ects of the reasons to quit on
wage growth and relates these ndings to earlier work on the relation between
wages and workersevaluation of di¤erent job aspects. Section 4 looks at the
e¤ect of workers reasons to quit on the decision to stay in or leave the
2The literature on displaced workers is surveyed by Kletzer (1998) and Kuhn (2002).
3
industry of employment. Furthermore, this section shows that neglecting
workers reasons to quit may lead to incorrect estimates of the e¤ect of a
change in industry on workerswages. Section 5 concludes.
2 The data
In 2002, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations conducted
a survey among employees who started in or left a public sector job in 2001.
Information about employees who had either entered or left an organisation
in the public sector was collected from salary administrations. Samples were
drawn and 22,000 employees who left an organisation and 20,250 employ-
ees who entered an organisation received a questionnaire, yielding 7,854 and
6,942 respondents, respectively.3 The data are weighted in two steps. First,
weights are applied so as to reect the information from the salary admin-
istrations on gender, age, tenure, province, and wage for each industry in
the public sector independently. These industries are the central govern-
ment, local governments, education, research, the police, the judicial system,
defense, and university hospitals.4 Second, each industry receives a weight
corresponding to its share in total public sector employment.
We merge the two samples, and divide the respondents in four groups,
depending on their former and new industry of employment. Stayers move to
another employer within the same industry, movers leave their former indus-
try of employment but remain employed in the public sector, leavers move
from the public sector to the private sector, and entrants move from the pri-
vate sector to the public sector. This gives 3,105 stayers, 1,967 movers, 2,483
entrants, and 1,112 leavers.5 Partial non-response reduces these numbers to
2,261, 1,430, 1,912, and 717, respectively. Implausible wage levels or wage
changes made us remove another 64 stayers, 34 movers, 79 entrants, and 28
leavers from the analysis.6
3Employees who moved from one job in the public sector to another may have received
two questionnaires. However, we nd no evidence of duplicate cases in the dataset.
4The data also distinguish nine di¤erent industries in the private sector.
5The focus on job-to-job mobility removes 2,904 respondents from the sample who did
not have a job before entering their public sector job, as well as 3,234 respondents who
did not take up another job after leaving their public sector job.
6We have set the oor and the ceiling for both the former and the new hourly wage
at 3 euro and 60 euro, respectively. The oor is slightly below the legal minimum wage
for 18-year old employees, and the ceiling is (in terms of monthly income) slightly above
a Ministers wage in the Netherlands. The cut-o¤ levels for relative wage change have
arbitrarily been set such that workers whose hourly wages more than halved or more than
tripled were excluded. Inspection of the data reveals that most of these cases involve typos,
misspecications, or misinterpretation of the questions (for instance, some respondents
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One of the main purposes of the survey was to gain insight into employees
reasons for entering or leaving a public sector job. The respondents who
had left a job were asked to indicate on a 5-point scale the importance of 19
potential reasons to quit in their decision to leave their old job. Furthermore,
they had to rank the three most important reasons to quit. We followMathios
(1989) in the construction of the reason-to-quit variables. A reason-to-quit
variable is assigned the value 0 if the respondent did not consider this reason
to quit important (1-3 on the 5-point scale), the value 1 if the respondent
considered the reason to quit important (4-5 on the 5-point scale), but did
not indicate it as one of the three most important reasons to quit, the value
2 if this reason to quit was the third most important reason, the value 3 if
this reason was the second most important reason, and the value 4 if it was
the most important reason to quit.7
Table 1 lists for each group of job movers the means of the reason-to-
quit variables. Interestingly, nancial motives appear less important than
dissatisfaction with management, (future) job duties, or the atmosphere at
work. Several di¤erences between the four groups emerge from Table 1.
The threat of involuntary separations prevails more often among entrants
than among the other job changers.8 Relatively many leavers have nancial
motives, whereas they complain least about work pressure. A relatively small
fraction of stayers indicate that they were unhappy with their job duties.
appear to report yearly rather than monthly income).
7This specication imposes arbitrary weights on the questions regarding the impor-
tance of job aspects, which is also acknowledged by Mathios (1989). We have checked the
robustness of our results by using di¤erent specications. Specications including only
the most important reason to quit or the three most important reasons to quit (equally
weighted) yield qualitatively similar results, but perform worse than the 0-1-2-3-4 speci-
cation in terms of explanatory power. Furthermore, we used a specication which imposes
no structure of weights, by inserting a dummy variable for each level of importance of all
job aspects. Again, qualitatively similar results emerge, although for several job aspects,
the magnitude of the coe¢ cients is not monotonically increasing in the level of impor-
tance. Still, the estimated e¤ects of job aspects being most importantrelative to being
not importantclosely resemble the estimations reported in the paper.
8Unfortunately, the survey among employees who entered a public sector job did not
explicitly ask whether the respondent quit their previous job. Hence, there may have
been some actual layo¤s and discharges in the sample. The survey among employees
who left a public sector job did ask whether the employee voluntarily left the job or
had been displaced. Given the evidence in the literature that the consequences of a
separation di¤er between workers who quit and workers who are displaced, we have checked
whether elimination of all respondents who considered threats of involuntary separations
important in their decision to quit would a¤ect our results.It turns out that all results are
qualitatively similar in this restricted sample, except for the e¤ect of the reason-to-quit
variable contractual hourson wage growth, which becomes smaller and insignicant (see
Table 3).
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Entrants emphasize (the lack of) possibilities for education and the number
of hours worked more often than the other groups. Many stayers report that
commuting time drove them to leave their old job, whereas leavers complain
less about this job aspect. Lastly, many leavers indicate that the management
at their former job was a reason for them to quit.
Summary statistics for several worker and job characteristics are listed
in Table 2. The variables married and children at home are dummy vari-
ables, representing whether or not the respondent has a partner or chil-
dren, respectively. The education dummies depend on the highest completed
level of schooling. Low education comprises respondents who completed pri-
mary school only and respondents who completed lower vocational education.
Medium education consists of workers with high school education or medium
vocational education, and higher vocational education and university speak
for themselves. Tenure describes the number of years a worker has been em-
ployed by his former employer. Experience is measured as the number of
years since the respondent nished education. Hourly wages are computed
from the respondentsmonthly income and contractual hours.9
Table 2 shows that compared to the other job changers, entrants have
less education, experience, and tenure, and earn less. The fraction of stayers
with higher vocational education or a university degree is relatively large.
Leavers obtain the largest wage growth, whereas stayers receive the smallest
increase in hourly wage. The average increase in hourly wage is 9.15 percent,
which is close to the estimates by Topel and Ward (1992).
This study focusses on job-to-job mobility. We also have data on the
reasons to quit of 237 employees who left a public sector job but did not
take up another job. In comparison to the gures in Table 1 and Table
2, these employees were more often female, less educated and worked fewer
hours. They considered work pressure and in particular the combination of
work and private life more important in their decision to quit. By contrast,
nancial prospects and future job duties were less important. This points to
the argument that some women may invest less in human capital, because
they expect to withdraw (temporarily) from the labour market at some point
in time to dedicate themselves to their family (see Weiss and Gronau, 1981,
Blau and Ferber, 1986, and Polachek and Kim, 1994).
9Respondents age is recorded in 5-year intervals, and is therefore not used in the
analysis.
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3 Wage e¤ects
Workers change jobs to improve upon job aspects which cause discomfort.
Hence, it is likely that the new job o¤ers better conditions with respect to
these troubling job aspects. Unfortunately, we can not assess the e¤ect of
the reasons to quit on all job aspects, as the survey did not ask workers
to compare job aspects of their former and new job. The data do allow us
to estimate the e¤ect of a workers reasons to quit on his wage. Hence, we
estimate:
(wi) = + Qi + Xi + ei (1)
where(wi) is the di¤erence in log hourly wage between the new and the for-
mer job of employee i and Qi is a vector of the 19 reason-to-quit variables. Xi
is a vector of other explanatory variables, containing the change in the num-
ber of hours worked, tenure, tenure-squared, experience, experience-squared,
and dummies for gender, minority, partner, children, educational levels, and
former and new industry.10 Table 3 reports the results of the estimation of
equation (1).
The results in Table 3 square well with the ndings of previous studies. In
line with Keith and McWilliams (1997), but in contrast to Loprest (1992), we
nd no evidence of smaller wage growth for females. On the contrary, after
the inclusion of the reasons-to-quit variables, the coe¢ cient on the female
dummy turns positive. Wage growth is positively related to the level of
education, as in Lima (2004) and Villanueva (2004), using Portuguese and
German data, respectively. Employees with a partner obtain a signicantly
smaller wage increase than singles. Villanueva (2004) reports a marriage
e¤ect of similar magnitude.
The reason-to-quit variables are jointly signicant at the 0.01 level, and
several are individually signicant as well. We nd that the threat of an
employer-initiated separation leads to signicantly smaller wage growth. This
is in line with evidence that job changers who quit obtain larger wage in-
creases than job changers who are laid-o¤ or discharged (McCaughlin, 1991,
Keith and McWilliams, 1997). However, as acknowledged before, we can not
rule out that this result is caused by a (small) number of actual layo¤s and
discharges in the sample. This suspicion is reinforced by the nding that
the e¤ect becomes insignicant if we restrict the sample to the survey among
employees who left a public sector job (recall that this survey explicitly asked
workers whether they quit their job or were displaced).
In line with Akerlof et al (1988), we nd that employees leaving their job
10Elimination of constant characteristics from the set of explanatory variables turns out
not to a¤ect the results.
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out of dissatisfaction with pecuniary rewards receive relatively large wage
increases. The specication of the reason-to-quit variables implies that an
employee for whom pay was the most important reason to quit obtains a
wage increase which is 10.8 percentage points higher than an employee for
whom rewards were not important in the decision to quit.
Responsibility and autonomy are also being rewarded, as employees com-
plaining about this job aspect receive signicantly larger wage increases. Pre-
dictions of both theory and previous empirical work are mixed. E¢ ciency
wage theory predicts a positive relation between employeesautonomy and
wages, while the theory of compensating di¤erentials suggests that employees
may be willing to give up a fraction of their income in return for more auton-
omy (see e.g. Dur and Glazer, 2004). In line with our result, some authors
nd a negative relation between supervision and pay (Krueger, 1991, Kruse,
1992, Rebitzer, 1995), while some nd a positive relation (Smith et al. 1997),
and others nding no relation (Leonard, 1987, Brunello, 1995). Similarly, in
line with our nding, Brown and Sessions (2002) report a positive relation be-
tween supervisorspay and the number of supervisees, but Frey and Kucher
(1999) nd no e¤ect of the number of subordinates on supervisorswages.
Somewhat surprising is the positive relation between dissatisfaction with
the number of hours worked and the wage change. Inspection of the data
reveals that workers for whom the number of hours worked was important in
their decision to quit on average increase the number of hours worked, but
variation is large.
Lastly, dissatisfaction with work pressure or with the combination of work
and private life appears to induce workers to accept signicantly smaller
wage growth. The coe¢ cient on work pressure implies that the di¤erence
between the wage growth of an employee for whom work pressure was the
most important reason to quit and an employee who did not consider work
pressure important is 4.8 percentage points, about half of the average wage
increase in the sample. Villanueva (2004) nds that job movers who indicate
that their work load has worsened obtain 5 percent higher wage growth,
whereas an improvement of work load yields 3 percent smaller wage growth,
both relative to workers whose work load did not change.
Overall, the ndings presented in this section t reasonably well into the
previous literature on the relation between wages and workersevaluation of
di¤erent job aspects. The next section shows that workersevaluation of job
aspects not only a¤ects their wage, but also their decision on where to (seek)
work.
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4 Where to go?
4.1 Intra- vs interindustry mobility
Insofar as job characteristics are correlated among jobs within an industry,
the employees experience in the initial job a¤ects the expectations of these
characteristics in other jobs in the industry. Then, workersexperience in a
job not only inuences his decision to stay in or quit the job, but also his de-
cision to stay in or leave the industry. For instance, the experience with job
duties or working conditions may a¤ect the employees expectations of these
characteristics at other employers in the industry. A bad experience then
reduces the expected value of all jobs in the industry, making a change in in-
dustry more likely. In contrast, several other job aspects, such as commuting
time and atmosphere at work, are unlikely to be related among employers
within an industry.
The information on workersreasons to quit provides us with the oppor-
tunity to examine the relation between workerssubjective evaluation of job
aspects and their decision to stay in or leave their industry of employment.
Thereto, we explore the di¤erences in the reasons to quit between stayers,
movers and leavers. These employees all quit jobs in public sector industries,
but only stayers have taken a new job in the same industry.11 Table 4 shows
the results of a logistic regression of the reasons to quit on the decision to stay
in or leave the industry of employment.12 The dependent variable is 0 if the
respondent is a stayer, and 1 if the respondent is a mover or a leaver. Hence,
a positive coe¢ cient implies that a higher value of the variable increases the
probability that a respondent leaves the industry, whereas a negative coef-
cient implies that a higher value of the variable increases the probability
that a respondent stays in the industry.
From Table 4, we conclude that workersexperience indeed a¤ects their
decision to stay in or leave the industry. Workers dissatised with pay, work
pressure, working conditions, and job duties are more likely to move to an-
other industry. These job aspects may very well be related among employers
in an industry. By contrast, the possibilities for education, the atmosphere
at work, the number of hours worked, and commuting time are reasons to
quit which decrease the probability that a worker moves to another industry,
11The lack of data on employees who change jobs within the private sector hinders a
similar estimation for private sector industries.
12We have found no other papers that investigate this decision for workers who vol-
untarily leave their job. Seitchik and Zornitsky (1989), Fallick (1993), Neal (1995), and
Kletzer (1996) analyse the determinants of the decision to stay in or leave the industry
for displaced workers.
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and are likely to be unrelated among employers in an industry. Somewhat
puzzling are the positive coe¢ cients on management and leadership. Appar-
ently, workers who are dissatised with their superiors lose condence in the
management of other employers in their industry.
These ndings point to an extension of the theory of job shopping (John-
son, 1978, Jovanovic, 1979). This theory postulates that workers are un-
certain about their valuation of jobs. By spending time on a job, workers
learn their true valuation of the job. A separation occurs when it becomes
clear that the match between the workers preferences or productivity and
the conditions of the job is bad. The results in Table 4 suggests that besides
information on their own job, workers also receive information on other jobs
in the industry. Hence, workersexperience on the job not only aides them
in deciding whether to stay in or quit the job, but also in where to go.
4.2 Reasons to leave the public sector
By regrouping the respondents, we can use the same method to analyse which
reasons to quit are related to leaving the public sector altogether. Stayers
and movers change jobs within the public sector, whereas leavers move from
a public sector job to a job in the private sector. Table 5 reports the result
of a logistic regression where the dependent variable is 0 if the respondent is
a stayer or a mover, and 1 if the respondent is a leaver. A positive coe¢ cient
thus indicates a positive relation between the variable and the likelihood that
the worker leaves the public sector.
We nd that employees who quit their public sector job out of dissat-
isfaction with rewards, nancial prospects, or management are more likely
to move to a job in the private sector. Similar, but somewhat less strong
e¤ects are found for physical working conditions and future job duties. This
resembles the reasons given by UK workers for their exit from the public
sector (Audit Commission, 2002). Likewise, Table 5 suggests that the public
sector may o¤er better conditions regarding the opportunities for education.
Yet, a similar analysis of the decision of private sector workers whether to
stay in or leave the private sector is needed for a more conclusive comparison
between public and private sector jobs.
The relatively high discontent with management among workers who leave
the public sector may be related to Dixits (2002) observation that public
agencies often face multiple principals. When the management of a public
agency is unable to translate the diverse interests and pressures of the prin-
cipals into a clear organisational goal and consistent objectives, workers may
lose condence in their managements capacities. Private rms are less prone
to pursue conicting goals, as the ultimate objective of a private rm is to
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generate shareholder value.
4.3 Wage e¤ect of a change in industry
In Table 6, we explore di¤erences in wage growth between stayers, movers
and leavers. Thereby, we can compare the wage growth of intra-industry job
movers (stayers) to the wage growth of interindustry job movers (movers and
leavers).13 The estimation without the reason-to-quit variables indicates that
leavers obtain a signicantly larger wage increase than stayers. Lima (2004)
reports a wage premium for a change in industry of similar magnitude in a
large sample of Portuguese workers. However, the second column of Table
6 makes clear that the di¤erences in wage growth between stayers, movers,
and leavers are fully explained by di¤erences in the reasons to quit the initial
job. Hence, we conclude that neglecting workersreasons to quit may yield
incorrect estimates of the e¤ect of a change in industry on wage growth.
Data limitations prevent us from di¤erentiating between workers enter-
ing, leaving, or staying in specic industries. Recent studies using matched
employer-employee data have shown that unobserved worker heterogeneity
explains most of the interindustry wage di¤erentials (Abowd et al., 1999,
Goux and Maurin, 1999). Relatedly, McLaughlin and Bils (2001), who nd
that workers leaving declining industries and workers entering growing indus-
tries tend to have higher wage growth than their new colleagues who did not
change industry, conjecture that the wage changes of interindustry movers
could be [explained] by an extension to compensating wage di¤erentials for
industry attributes(p. 131). Although on a more aggregate level, the re-
sults in Table 6 conrm that di¤erences in wage growth between intra- and
interindustry job movers may be explained by heterogeneous preferences for
industry-specic components of job characteristics.
5 Conclusions
Using data from a survey among Dutch job changers, this paper has shown
that workersexperience in their initial job a¤ects their decision to stay in
or leave their industry of employment. When pay, work pressure, working
conditions, job duties, or management were important in the decision to quit,
workers were more likely to change their industry of employment. By con-
trast, a quit out of dissatisfaction with commuting time, atmosphere at work,
13The di¤erence with the estimations in Table 3 is that the dummies for the new industry
of employment have been replaced by dummies for movers and leavers, with stayers as base
category.
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educational opportunities, or working hours makes a change in industry less
likely. Apparently, workers use their experience to update their expecta-
tions on other jobs in the industry, as the rst group of job aspects is more
likely to be related among jobs within an industry than the latter group of
job aspects. Relatedly, many workers who quit out of dissatisfaction with
pay, physical working conditions, or management leave the public sector al-
together. Hence, improvement of these job aspects should receive priority
if employee turnover in the public sector is to be reduced. Furthermore, it
has been shown that the apparent wage premium of interindustry job movers
relative to intra-industry job movers vanishes once the estimation controls
for workersreasons to quit.
A similar, but economy-wide survey of job changers would improve the
analysis of the e¤ects of workers reasons to quit. For instance, with the
addition of job changers within the private sector, an analysis of the rela-
tively attractive and repulsive aspects of public sector jobs would be feasible.
Moreover, if the sample would be large enough, then for each industry the
main reasons to enter or leave the industry can be assessed. As called for by
McLaughlin and Bils (2001), this may facilitate the estimation of industry
attributes and their e¤ect on workerswages.
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Table 1: Means of the reason-to-quit variables
Reasons to quit Stayers Movers Leavers Entrants
Threat of reorganisation 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.35
Threat of losing job 0.18 0.19 0.13 0.26
Duration of contract 0.37 0.37 0.24 0.24
Rewards 0.52 0.63 0.84 0.65
Financial prospects 0.66 0.79 1.06 0.85
Work pressure 0.64 0.60 0.47 0.64
Facilities at work 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.28
Physical working conditions 0.26 0.29 0.27 0.44
Job duties 0.90 1.38 1.16 1.35
Future job duties 1.02 1.36 1.38 1.11
Possibilities for education / training 0.45 0.54 0.43 0.79
Atmosphere 1.13 0.96 0.98 1.07
Contractual hours 0.28 0.23 0.19 0.49
Combination of work and private life 0.74 0.61 0.52 0.75
Commuting time 0.98 0.59 0.34 0.63
Personnel management 0.84 0.86 1.20 0.78
Management of the organisation 0.81 0.98 1.26 0.84
Style of leadership 1.01 1.03 1.28 0.86
Autonomy / responsibility 0.84 0.91 0.92 0.88
Observations 2197 1396 689 1833
Data source: BZK, Mobiliteitsonderzoek 2002.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variables Stayers Movers Leavers Entrants
Female 0.532 0.542 0.379 0.462
(0.499) (0.498) (0.486) (0.499)
Minority 0.029 0.038 0.042 0.054
(0.167) (0.191) (0.200) (0.226)
Married / living together 0.806 0.766 0.777 0.680
(0.395) (0.424) (0.416) (0.467)
Kids at home 0.535 0.473 0.435 0.368
(0.499) (0.499) (0.496) (0.483)
Low education 0.035 0.074 0.073 0.136
(0.185) (0.261) (0.261) (0.343)
Medium education 0.140 0.209 0.256 0.337
(0.347) (0.407) (0.437) (0.473)
Higher vocational education 0.604 0.392 0.379 0.304
(0.489) (0.488) (0.485) (0.460)
University 0.221 0.325 0.292 0.223
(0.415) (0.469) (0.455) (0.416)
Tenure (in years) 7.370 6.870 7.060 4.690
(7.427) (6.615) (6.670) (5.463)
Experience (in years) 13.635 11.684 11.490 10.051
(9.326) (8.701) (8.109) (8.276)
Hours worked in old job 33.024 32.586 35.379 32.819
(7.941) (7.900) (5.688) (8.859)
Hours worked in new job 33.186 32.913 35.473 34.079
(7.764) (7.421) (5.293) (7.034)
Hourly wage old job (e) 15.611 14.855 15.591 12.643
(5.581) (5.884) (6.109) (5.967)
Hourly wage new job (e) 16.978 16.406 17.424 13.761
(6.346) (6.696) (7.250) (6.066)
 log hourly wage 0.079 0.096 0.105 0.098
(0.180) (0.241) (0.219) (0.257)
Observations 2197 1396 689 1833
Data source: BZK, Mobiliteitsonderzoek 2002.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 3: The e¤ects of the reason-to-quit variables on wage growth
Reasons to quit excluded Reasons to quit included
Variable Coe¢ cient SE Coe¢ cient SE
Constant 0.112*** (0.019) 0.054** (0.021)
Female 0.000 (0.006) 0.011* (0.006)
Minority 0.012 (0.014) 0.002 (0.014)
Married -0.022*** (0.007) -0.017** (0.007)
Kids at home 0.006 (0.006) 0.008 (0.007)
Medium education 0.021* (0.012) 0.021* (0.012)
Higher voc. education 0.044*** (0.012) 0.048*** (0.012)
University 0.040*** (0.013) 0.046*** (0.013)
Threat of reorganisation -0.009** (0.004)
Threat of losing job -0.009** (0.004)
Duration of contract 0.004 (0.003)
Rewards 0.027*** (0.003)
Financial prospects 0.014*** (0.003)
Work pressure -0.012*** (0.003)
Facilities at work 0.001 (0.005)
Working conditions -0.001 (0.004)
Job duties 0.003 (0.002)
Future job duties 0.001 (0.002)
Education -0.002 (0.003)
Atmosphere 0.001 (0.002)
Contractual hours 0.008** (0.004)
Work vs private life -0.007*** (0.003)
Commuting time -0.003 (0.002)
Pers. management 0.002 (0.003)
Management org. -0.001 (0.003)
Style of leadership 0.002 (0.003)
Autonomy/responsibility 0.010*** (0.002)
R2 0.076 0.118
Observations 6115 6115
Data source: BZK, Mobiliteitsonderzoek 2002.
* signicant at the 0.10 level. ** signicant at the 0.05 level. *** signicant at the 0.01 level.
Also included, but not reported, were the change in the number of working hours, tenure,
tenure-squared, experience, experience-squared and dummies for the former and new
sector of employment.
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Table 4: Reasons to stay in or leave the industry
Dependent variable: 0 = stayer, 1 = mover or leaver
Variable Coe¢ cient SE
Constant 2.702*** (0.434)
Female -0.071 (0.083)
Minority 0.284 (0.197)
Married 0.015 (0.094)
Kids at home -0.143* (0.085)
Medium education -0.215 (0.189)
Higher voc. education -0.533*** (0.192)
University -0.190 (0.208)
Log hourly wage old job -0.353*** (0.130)
Threat of reorganisation -0.003 (0.056)
Threat of losing job 0.048 (0.056)
Duration of contract -0.076* (0.041)
Rewards 0.096*** (0.036)
Financial prospects 0.095*** (0.034)
Work pressure 0.099*** (0.034)
Facilities at work -0.020 (0.069)
Working conditions 0.138** (0.054)
Job duties 0.141*** (0.028)
Future job duties 0.115*** (0.030)
Education -0.171*** (0.044)
Atmosphere -0.079*** (0.029)
Contractual hours -0.119** (0.058)
Work vs private life -0.026 (0.036)
Commuting time -0.193*** (0.034)
Pers. management 0.040 (0.035)
Management org. 0.212*** (0.035)
Style of leadership 0.081** (0.032)
Autonomy/responsibility -0.021 (0.031)
Nagelkerke R2 0.315
Observations 4282
Data source: BZK, Mobiliteitsonderzoek 2002.
* signicant at the 0.10 level. ** signicant at the 0.05 level. *** signicant at the 0.01 level.
Also included, but not reported, were the number of working hours, tenure, tenure-squared,
experience, experience-squared, and dummies for the former sector of employment.
20
Table 5: Reasons to stay in or leave the public sector
Dependent variable: 0 = stayer or mover, 1 = leaver
Variable Coe¢ cient SE
Constant -2.217*** (0.557)
Female -0.229 (0.105)
Minority 0.197 (0.231)
Married 0.078 (0.118)
Kids at home -0.280*** (0.106)
Medium education 0.113 (0.206)
Higher voc. education -0.392* (0.220)
University -0.214 (0.240)
Log hourly wage old job 0.171 (0.167)
Threat of reorganisation -0.024 (0.075)
Threat of losing job -0.045 (0.079)
Duration of contract -0.117** (0.059)
Rewards 0.153*** (0.042)
Financial prospects 0.131*** (0.041)
Work pressure -0.015 (0.048)
Facilities at work -0.015 (0.089)
Working conditions 0.132* (0.071)
Job duties 0.008 (0.036)
Future job duties 0.092** (0.038)
Education -0.178*** (0.065)
Atmosphere -0.029 (0.038)
Contractual hours -0.074 (0.084)
Work vs private life -0.063 (0.050)
Commuting time -0.380*** (0.057)
Pers. management 0.121*** (0.042)
Management org. 0.154*** (0.041)
Style of leadership 0.108*** (0.039)
Autonomy/responsibility 0.013 (0.039)
Nagelkerke R2 0.180
Observations 4282
Data source: BZK, Mobiliteitsonderzoek 2002.
* signicant at the 0.10 level. ** signicant at the 0.05 level. *** signicant at the 0.01 level.
Also included, but not reported, were the number of working hours, tenure, tenure-squared,
experience, experience-squared, and dummies for the former sector of employment.
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Table 6: Reasons to quit and the wage growth of intra- and in-
terindustry job movers
Reasons to quit excluded Reasons to quit included
Variable Coe¢ cient SE Coe¢ cient SE
Movers 0.007 (0.008) 0.002 (0.007)
Leavers 0.016* (0.009) 0.001 (0.009)
Reasons to quit NO YES
R2 0.088 0.125
Observations 4282 4282
Data source: BZK, Mobiliteitsonderzoek 2002.
* signicant at the 0.10 level. ** signicant at the 0.05 level. *** signicant at the 0.01 level.
Except for the dummies for the new sector of employment, all variables included in the
specications of Table 3 are also included here.
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